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Introduction
This research considers the extent to which
changes in the environment forced banks to
move from a producer-oriented definition of
competitiveness to one that recognised that
banks’ ability to manage the linkages between
activities and customers was the main issue.
The possibility that strategic and financial
control of capabilities would develop into a
competitive edge was originally put forward
by Penrose (1959, p. 110) and successfully
measured by Rumelt (1974) and more recently
by Yip (1982). Surveys of the literature
exploring Penrose’s propositions for firm
growth are found in Ramanujan and
Varadarajan (1989), Conner (1991) and Schulze
(1994). Penrose’s main proposition was that
strategic intent which directed the resources,
dedicated assets, intangible assets, skills and
other inputs to the production process was the
main determinant of a firm’s ability to
compete and capture the most promising
growth opportunities.
Strategic intent will also determine
whether the firm must develop new
capabilities or resources and whether the
firm must change co-ordination and co-
operation patterns between people, and
between people and resources (Grant, 1991, p.
22). Strategic intent, therefore, establishes
which resources and capabilities will
determine future profitability. These profit
generating resources and capabilities that
are key to deliver future competitive
advantage are called core capabilities.
According to Hamel and Prahalad (1994, p.
142), effective control of core capabilities
provides the platform by which strategic
intent achieves managers’ pre-conceived
boundaries for the organisation, that is,
boundaries in terms of geography, service
diversity and customer group. The research
that follows established whether, in light of
external change and enhanced competition,
bank managers had become more confident
in identifying their bank’s core capabilities
and whether these capabilities supported the
diversification strategies generally followed.
The research anticipated that bank managers
would be able to isolate each stage of their
value chain to assess whether activities such
as client capture, asset origination or
treasury operations were adding value over
and above the resources they absorbed. Bank
managers were judged to be in control of
their profitability drivers only if they could
anticipate how external change caused value
added to rise or fall in providing bundles of
financial services to customer segments.
By collecting bank managers’ perceptions
on the effect of external innovations on the
profitability ofindividualor bundled services,
customer segments, geographical markets and
service channels, the research was able to
contribute to the description of separate
activities that are necessary to underpin an
organisation’s strategy. The main research
methodology consisted of semi-structured
interviews. Participants with direct and
indirectresponsibilities in bank markets from
Mexico, Spain, and the UK provided the
possibility to explore changes in strategy and
how external change altered the strategic gap
between banks’ actual and desired states.
Managers from Mexico, Spain and the UK
were used to represent three distinct
competitive environments. Triangulation of
responses was then used to identify
successful responses to external innovation
and, in particular, changes in regulation and
information technology (IT) developments.
Cross-country and management style
differences enabled the research to trace
widespread effects of several simultaneous
and mutually reinforcing trends that
challenged the retail banking services sector
in Western Europe and North America
during the late 1980s and 1990s. The research,
therefore, focused on changes affecting bank
markets in general rather than emphasising
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This research considers the way
banks have altered their
strategies as regulatory change
(i.e. deregulation) and information
technology (IT) innovations
created more opportunities for
service delivery and extended the
range of potential competitors and
forms of competition. These
external changes provided new
diversification and growth
opportunities but also modified
prior expectations about the way
managers defined and controlled
their bank’s core capabilities in
pursuing current and potential
business. The main research
instrument used was a one hour,
semi-structured interview; and in
total 55 managers of commercial
banks, investment banks,
management consulting firms and
regulators from Mexico, Spain and
the UK participated. Qualitative
and quantitative analysis
established that the great majority
of banks responded to changes in
growth opportunities through
diversification moves but with no
clear link to core capabilities. IT
management played a secondary
role in the design of bank strategy
but at the same time, IT
applications were perceived as an
important force to modify
competition in bank markets by
supporting radical re-engineering
of service delivery in ways that
undermined previous advantages
of scale and scope.changes particular to a country or region
(more below).
The survey results also helped to clarify
how sustainable advantage creation in bank
markets involves matching internal and
external adjustment processes. External
change was seen as creating dramatic change
in both the amount and balance of resources
such as labour and organisational skills
needed to deliver financial services.
Simultaneously technology provided new
channels of access to customers offering
improved service at one-hundredth of the
cost.
The document proceeds as follows. The
second section reviews the literature on
diversification and changes in competition
within bank markets with particular
reference to the way banks internalise or
externalise the value-added activities used in
creating financial services. The third section
discusses the methodology used in the semi-
structured interviews. The fourth section
provides a quantitative and qualitative
analysis of interviews. Finally, the fifth
section offers a summary and tentative
conclusions.
Diversification and resource
control in bank markets
The value chain in retail finance
Porter’s (1985) original insight into the way
management of profitability drivers creates
value was further developed by Shepherd
(1998) and applied to commercial banks by
Canals (1994, p. 199), among others. An
understanding of the way value added is
created from the separate components of
banks’ typically complex service offering is
vital in underpinning an organisation’s
diversification or market positioning moves.
Value chain analysis also helps to define
activities within and around an organisation
that create competitive strengths. Canals
(1994, p. 198) argues such analysis provides
insights into how the implementation of
strategic intent will affect cost structures at
each value stage.
Value chain analysis was therefore an
important tool in analysing the response of
managers in commercial banks to external
change. Following Klein (1971, p. 206),
Benston and Smith (1976, p. 215),
Baltensperger (1980, p. 1) and Swank (1996, p.
193), commercial banks are defined as
financial intermediaries that accept deposits
without explicit payment of interest (sight
accounts) and create assets that are generally
acceptable means of exchange (paper and
electronic payment instruments).
Commercial banks can also be defined
from a consumer perspective. According to
Lewis (1994, p. 270) and McKechnie (1997,
p. 65), there are two service quality
expectations that distinguish financial
services, namely fiduciary responsibilities
and two-way information flows between bank
and customer. Firstly, fiduciary
responsibilities refer to the responsibility
that financial service organisations have
regarding the management of their
customers’ funds and the nature of the
financial advice supplied. Secondly, two-way
information flows reflect individual
customers repeatedly purchasing the same
service from the same bank, sometimes over
extended periods of time. Financial
transactions and particularly those in retail
bank markets require a great deal of
information that reflects the latest changes in
customers’ private and confidential financial
status.
In brief, customer buying decisions of
financial services are likely to be based on
experience and credence qualities rather
than search or pricing attributes.
Information emerging from these
transactions can then be used by commercial
banks to maintain and develop relationships
with existing customers as well as attracting
new ones.
Regulation and cross-subsidisation
The centrality of commercial banks to
confidence in the financial system and their
essential role in supporting economic
activity led to a strong regulatory regime
emerging in Europe and North America
especially following the 1930s (Gilbert, 1984,
p. 617). Regulation took for granted that the
essential role of retail financial services was
to harness savings and channel them into
productive investment (Klein, 1971, p. 214)
and also that banks operate within
predictable environments (Muda, 1993, p.
253). Regulation therefore imposed capital
adequacy and prudential requirements to
protect depositors from bank default and
limited participation in national payments
mechanisms to adequately funded and
managed banks.
Service issues were not a feature of this
regulation. Retail branches were simply
distribution points to accept and process
client instructions such as deposits,
payments and requests for loan facilities.
Significant decisions on credit approvals or
treasury operations whereby banks
deposited funds for investment in organised
markets were taken at head or regional
offices, rather than close to service points.
This reflected the relative importance of
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with customer service. Under this
framework commercial banks existed as
multi-service firms, producing a wide range
of services from a largely undifferentiated set
of common resources (among others Fraser
et al., 1995, p. 7 and Heffernan, 1996, p. 17).
Bank growth revolved around incremental
revenue and this favoured the proliferation
of financial services and in the absence of
clear benchmarks bank charges were
subjective, often discriminatory across
services and customer groups and involving
arbitrary cross-subsidisation (Klein, 1971, p.
216; Neven, 1990, p. 168). In particular
unwillingness or inability to charge the
economic cost operating current accounts
and for use of the national payment systems
meant higher charges for other services.
Cross-subsidisation meant activities only
weakly reflected their cost determinants or
natural geographic areas (among others
Gardener and Molyneux, 1990, p. 218;
Channon, 1988, p. 14). The aim was to provide
enough revenue from a bundle of services to
support the apparently irrecoverable costs
entailed in being a bank. But in that process
managers lost track of the different steps
through which a bank’s value added rises or
falls (Canals, 1994, p. 197). A portfolio of
activities contributing at gross margin level
but absorbing an indeterminate amount of
common resources resulted in blurred
pricing schemes that biased the development
of banking systems and undermined the
assumption that bank managers had control
over the drivers of their firms’ performance.
Not surprisingly until recently the viability
of banks was only a minor part of the
academic literature on banking (Swank, 1996,
p. 194). But with deregulation and with the
growing power of technology to track costs
and profitability at customer and service
level, banks’ process culture and
undifferentiated strategies were about to face
a period of extraordinary challenge.
Support for contestability in banking after
deregulation
Among others Gardener and Molyneux (1990,
p. 98ff.) and Humphrey and Pulley (1997, p. 83)
argue that during the 1980s regulatory and
technological change increased the
competitiveness of bank markets in Western
Europe and North America. According to
Baumol et al. (1982, p. 269), changes in banks’
size and diversity reflected increased
competition in bank markets in ways that
increasingly met the criteria for perfectly
contestable markets. Contestable markets
are those where profits are influenced by
competition not just from incumbents in a
market but also from external firms which
have the capability and right to enter if they
choose. If banks are unable to find further
cost reductions or income growth associated
with economies of scope (i.e. synergy) or
from service or geographical economies of
scale (i.e. greater size) they can be said to
have achieved their optimal size.
Contestability has then achieved the same
result as competition in ``traditional’’
competitive markets.
Evidence from the US and UK banking
industries failed to provide full supportto the
proposition of greater contestability of bank
markets resulting from deregulation,
information technology (IT) innovation and
other external changes during the 1970s and
1980s (Bank of England, 1991; Dickens and
Phillipatos, 1994). Nevertheless, during the
1970s and 1980s banks experienced reduced
rates of financial return despite raised fees
for deposit services, reduced branch
operating costs and a shift to higher earning
assets. They responded to external
innovations such as regulatory change and
IT applications by marked shifts in their
balance-sheet size, business-portfolio
diversity and geographic scope (Gardener
and Molyneux, 1990, p. 98), though by no
means in the same way.
Changes in cost efficiency would thus
suggest that regulatory change and IT
innovations caused bank managers to reassess
the level of resources needed to create value.
Indeed, evidence on changes in size and
diversity of banks documented in Gilbert
(1984, pp. 28, 43), Muda (1993, p. 39), Heffernan
(1996, p. 135) and Walter (1997, p. 345) would
suggest that changes in banks’ size and
business portfolio followed external changes
over bank markets. But some of this evidence
would also suggest that banks’ strategic
responses were still short of the competitive
(or perfectly contestable market) benchmark.
Documented evidence would thus suggest
that:
some of the external changes increased
competition in bank markets;
other external changes modified the
provision of factors with which banks
undertake their activities (i.e. cost
drivers); and
contestability challenges such as
insurance companies entering the
unsecured lending market required banks
to respond with new service and pricing
strategies.
In summary, many studies on the degree of
competition in banking aimed to assess
external change and, in particular, whether
regulatory change and technical innovation
[91]
Bernardo Ba Âtiz-Lazo and
Douglas Wood
Management of core
capabilities in Mexican and
European banks
International Journal of Bank
Marketing
19/2 [2001] 89±100modified barriers to enter and exit bank
markets. Variations due to changes in the
strategic goals and objectives of bank
managers and in their effective control of
distinctive resources such as organisational
skills, capabilities and other intangible assets
were neglected. As a result, evidence remains
vague on the role visionary strategies play to
explain changes in individual banks’ size,
scope and diversity as a response to
deregulation and technical change.
Research methodology
Questionnaire design
The initial design of the interview built upon
drafts of case studies and included six
separate interviews with top bank managers.
Participants included bank chief executives
(CEO), heads of planning and academics who
were board members of major clearing banks
within their countries. Case studies and
open-ended interviews provided a basic
agenda on the major areas of concern for
commercial banks. Based on these initial
encounters work began on the design of a
formal interview schedule. The survey
initially comprised 44 questions. During the
course of further interviews three questions
were formally added (more below). In total
each interview had a potential of 68 separate
answers and the modal response of 41
questions (minimum one and maximum 55).
The overall response rate to questions was 55
per cent of the total and thus over-performing
initial expectations (Oppenheim, 1992, p. 81).
Most interviews took place between April
and July 1996, with some as early as March or
as late as October. Eight persons (15 per cent
of the total) answered a shorter version in
writing and these responses were used
exclusively for the qualitative assessment.
In total, 20 per cent of the schedule was
prompted in check-list form. One out of six
interviewees redefined the alternatives
prompted, that is, an average 80 per cent of
total close-form responses prompted
constructs that were plausible indicators of
strategic planning in banks and
diversification moves in bank markets.
Constructs related to banks’ strategic
planningprocesses had fewer innovations (12
per cent of total responses) than those into
bank diversification moves (16 per cent of
total responses).
The semi-structured nature of the
interview allowed questions to be reworded
where previously unconsidered areas
emerged in the course of the discussion
(Gordem, 1975, p. 74; Belson and Duncan,
1978, p. 160). The other prompt provided
unanticipated answers for a variety of
reasons but especially in relation to time
concepts. These time concepts included the
years needed to establish long-, medium- and
short-term strategies or length of planning
horizons. Interviewee assessments also
included the need to distinguish between
long-term growth and liquidity influences on
diversification concerns. As a result, the
analysis was able to make a distinction
between moves within retail bank markets
reflecting a response to liquidity changes
within the broad economic cycle; and
diversification or repositioning moves made
reflecting long-term responses to change in
the attractiveness of individual financial
service markets.
Question wording and sample
characteristics
The interview schedule was initially written
in English and aimed to avoid technical
terms (following Moser and Kalton, 1978,
p. 141). The schedule was translated into
Spanish using, as far as possible, equivalents
to operational concerns. Each version of the
interview schedule was reviewed by
independent groups of British, Spanish and
Latin American graduate students of Master
in Business Administration (MBA), from a
highly recognised British institution. The
aim of the review was to develop measures
that were comparable across countries. In
this way the schedule minimised the risk of
having translation subtly changing the
significance, meaning or overtones of the
statements in different social settings
(Oppenheim, 1992, p. 184; Foddy, 1993, p. 9).
A problem highlighted by the exercise was
the absence of a colloquial equivalent in
Spanish for core capabilities. The inherent
ambiguity of the widely used concept created
problems even in English (as documented in
Collis, 1994, p. 143; Hamel and Prahalad, 1994,
p. 247; Schulze, 1994, p. 129; among others).
Prior to the interview process telephone and
e-mail enquiries of four management
consultants, four business school academics
in Spain and two in Mexico were used to
establish current practice. As a result, the
interview schedule used capacidad intrõ Ânseca
in Mexico and capacidades esenciales in
Spain. This was supplemented by a
standardised definition in a footnote in the
handouts[1].
The survey aimed to capture how similar
regulatory changes impacted in three
different competitive environments. The
benchmark was Britain because it already
had large and highly competitive wholesale
banking markets, and preceded the other two
countries in regulatory changes in its retail
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participants (33 per cent) in bank markets
also seemed to have adopted key technology
innovations before the Mexican (24 per cent)
or Spanish (43 per cent) banking markets
(Gavito et al., 1992). The deregulation
timetable in Spain, though starting later, was
more intensive as it sought to meet the
European Union’s Single Market
requirements and Euro membership targets
(Lloyd-Williams et al., 1994). Mexican
banking markets produced comparative data
on changes on growth opportunities specific
to Mexico and related to regulatory change
and on change common to all banks mainly
triggered by technology.
Interviewees were split into two categories:
participants and observers. Participants
were at senior management level in banks
with more than two years of direct
involvement in the design of strategy at
regional, national or international level. Of
interviewees, 55 per cent were in this
category drawn from commercial banks (43
per cent), cajas de ahorro (i.e. Spanish
savings banks) (7 per cent) and building
societies (5 per cent). Observers had
considerable experience in the banking
sector but no current line responsibility and
included bank analysts from investment
banks (24 per cent), management consultants
(16 per cent) and regulators (5 per cent).
Sector specialists were either in the sample
country or at the London office of the
investment bank. Management consultants
were Partners or Project Managers in all but
one case, from a ``Top 6’’ firm. Management
consultants also had a minimum of two
years’ experience in servicing commercial
banks. Regulators had experience in the
central bank’s research or external audit
departments. This careful screening ensured
all interviews were productive in that they
produced credible and internally consistent
responses that reflected a sound knowledge
of bank strategic management.
In 22 cases (40 per cent) multiple responses
came from the same institution although
always from different business areas. This
duplication proved useful in cross validating
judgements about strategic behaviour
(Bowman and Ambrosini, 1997) and
achieving improved social generality of
responses (Foddy, 1993, p. 82). Medium- and
small-sized participants based in provincial
cities were also included in the sample to
increase the diversity of responses and
strengthen triangulation throughout the
research (Yin, 1984, p. 48; Eisenhardt, 1989, p.
537; Robson, 1993, p. 290). Institutions
included in the survey controlled more than
60 per cent of banking assets in each of the
countries.
In brief, through triangulation of survey
responses the research identified changes
affecting retail bank markets. Perceptions of
Mexican managers were key to clarify which
changes affected bank markets in general to
those particular to a country or region. The
research then traced how external
innovations modified banks’ value chain.
Changes in how value added rises or falls
built upon on managers’ emphasis to engage
in diversification strategies within retail
bank markets based on financial targets,
strategic (i.e. market share) targets or a
combination of financial and strategic
targets. Survey results, therefore, provided
insight into the effectiveness of strategic
intent to determine future profitability by
directing core capabilities to capture
competitive advantage.
The effects of external change on
banks’ value chain
Changes in the competitive environment
The statistical analysis of survey results did
not confirm any significant convergence on
what might be described as a single model for
a bank nor did it provide evidence of a
common view amongst bank managers about
the dynamics and their control of the profit
generating process[2]. This result suggests
that despite deregulation and technology
change the banking market continues to be
segmented. The questionnaire results did
establish some important links between
contextual elements and banks’ corporate
strategy. The opportunistic nature of
diversificationwas evident in that 74 per cent
of the respondents indicated a tactical rather
than a strategic motivation. In these
responses diversification moves were more
likely to take place during positive states for
the economy and/or the market sector.
Table I illustrates that growth potential of
individual retail bank markets (i.e. product
maturity) was the primary motivation for
diversification moves in 36 per cent of cases
with the overall growth of the economy as the
motive in 16 per cent of cases. In comparison
the banks’ core capabilities were the primary
factor in diversification in 26 per cent of
cases and bank specific factors in 23 per cent.
The importance of market opportunities in
retail financial services was reflected as
expected growth and profitability of
individualservices relative to core capability
considerations. The importance of market
opportunities suggested that in bank markets
tactical strategies were driven more by
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strategic intent. The research further
explored the possibility that anticipated
competitive advantage was greater when
organisational flexibility provided effective
response to environmental change (i.e.
tactical strategies) than when bank managers
focused on enhancing core capabilities (i.e.
visionary strategies) prior to diversification.
Table II shows that despite deregulation 64
per cent of responses still see regulation as a
constraining factor on domestic
diversification with 100 per cent seeing
foreign regulation as a constraint on
international diversification. This pattern
was surprisingly similar for the Spanish and
UK banks operating within the Single Market
in Financial Services and the Mexican banks
operating outside. However 64 per cent of
respondents reported that regulatory
barriers were less important than core
capabilities in determining bank expansion
strategies.
It appears, then, that competitive intensity
and environmental turbulence also influence
the relative importance of core capabilities in
determining banks’ expansion strategies.
More generally, environmental turbulence,
such as fluctuations in inflation, economic
growth and business performance, could lead
to higher uncertainty about competitive
advantage. Mexican interviewees, finding
themselves in a turbulent environment,
emphasised economic growth and local
regulation as limits to their growth while
Spanish participants emphasised core
capabilities and the growth potential of
individual markets (i.e. product maturity).
British banks which enjoyed the most stable
environment focused on core capabilities,
and technical and social developments.
Mexican interviewees attached less
importance to long-term (visionary)
strategies than their Spanish or British
counterparts. Competitive advantage for
Mexican banks was likelier to arise from
tactical strategies or fortuitous association
between positioning and environmental
change. Their low expectations of achieving
sustained competitive advantage arose
because of the unwillingness or inability of
Mexican managers to sustain the focused
budget allocations needed to succeed in the
pursuit of corporate vision (i.e. long-term
strategy). Overall interview results suggested
that banks were far more likely to build their
services, channel and customer position as a
result of tactical moves than from a
Table I









Are diversification decisions positively correlated with economic growth?
Yes 71.4 70.0 80.0 73.8
No 14.3 30.0 20.0 23.8
Other 14.3 0.0 0.0 2.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Which is more important for diversification decisions:
Economic growth 50.0 5.9 20.0 16.1
Product maturity 0.0 52.9 20.0 35.5
Core capabilities 0.0 23.5 40.0 25.8
Other 50.0 17.6 20.0 22.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table II









Does regulation influence your banks’ diversification decisions?
Yes 84.6 54.5 58.3 63.8
No 15.4 40.9 41.7 34.0
Other 0.0 4.5 0.0 2.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
What is more important to determine banks’ expansion?
Government regulation 23.1 13.6 0.0 12.0
Core capabilities 53.8 54.5 86.7 64.0
Other 23.1 31.8 13.3 24.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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development of core capabilities.
Banks’ internal control: financial
considerations and investment decisions
The influence of the competitive
environment over the relative importance of
core capabilities was further made evident in
the valuation of new investments. Results
showed that planning periods and
investment horizons observed an inverse
correlation with the cost of capital (equal to
±0.33 on average and significant at the 95 per
cent level). Lower environmental turbulence
in the UK meant longer break-even periods
and planning horizons than in Mexico while
Spain was somewhere in the middle. TableIII
indicates that time spans for strategic
investments are far shorter where the cost of
capital is high.
Planning horizons differed significantly
between respondents. For management
consultants, a break-even of one year was
expected while bank managers were using
multi-year periods. Results also showed that
both by country of origin and by sector a
longer break-even was accepted for stand
alone business than for core or strategic
complement business where uncertainty was
lower. Since strategic complement or core
business are the main source of income,
particularly sustained income, the
application of faster paybacks to such
projects confirmed the tactical approach
rather than heavy reliance on strategic or
visionary long-term investments. As a result
participants seemed to invest in already
tested diversification or repositioning moves
rather than in creative or visionary projects
requiring a redefinition of operating
practice.
The interviews in any event revealed little
discrimination between strategic
complement or core capability investments
and stand alone with the same discount rate
applied to all capital investment. Table IV
shows that although interviewees considered
core capabilities more important than
regulation in determining their
diversification or market positioning moves
the same discount rates are applied to all
strategic investments. This confirms the
preference for already tested diversification
or market positioning moves. The result is
also consistent with the growth potential of
the individual markets being considered
more important than core capabilities in
determining banks’ diversification moves.
The implication of differential discount
rates for stand alone, core and strategic
complementary investments is evident when
interviewees discussed the relationship
between telephone banking and their core
capabilities. Some banks considered
telephone banking a platform for growth
because it increased distribution and client
capture opportunities and could be applied to
a range of business lines (such as Banco Ixe
in Mexico). Indeed, without this competence
banks would lose access to an increasing part
of their existing market. Other bank
managers, however, considered telephone
banking a strategic complement to current
activities or resources unique to a business
unit and, thus, set up new franchises.
Examples of the latter include Midland’s
First Direct in the UK or Banco Santander’s
Open Bank in Spain.
Table III
Strategic planning horizons and effectiveness of strategy, 1996
Country of origin Sector
Mexico Spain UK Banks Analysts Consult
Expected period for financial break-even (in years):
Stand alone business 2 3 4 3 4 1
Standard deviation 1.65 1.25 2.70 2.00 2.31 1.00
Business that is critical
for core capabilities 2 2 4 2 3 2
Standard deviation 1.29 1.59 2.70 1.48 1.70 1.61
Businesses that were
strategic complement to existing businesses 1 2 3 2 3 1
Standard deviation 1.02 1.13 1.99 1.53 1.46 0.65
Average time scale in strategic planning (in years):
Long term 2 4 6 4 5 3
Standard deviation 1.38 1.68 2.83 2.25 1.87 1.47
Medium term 1 2 2 2 2 2
Standard deviation 0.70 1.30 1.50 1.41 1.16 0.74
Short term 0 0 1 0 0 0
Standard deviation 0.11 0.48 0.42 0.46 0.53 0.36
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of discount rates was that some managers
perceived core capabilities as platform-based
and others saw them as a unique set of profit
generating resources. Conceptual problems
in defining core capabilities did not seem
though to have much impact on the financial
expectations placed on new investments.
This apparent paradox is further explored in
the next section.
Banks’ internal control: mixing strategic
and financial targets
As far as interviewees could recall, the
emphasis in bank markets in their country
and at their bank had been to grow the
portfolio of business lines rather than
increase focus on core capabilities. Discount
rates used in project finance were influenced
by country-specific factors, such as real rates
up to 18 per cent in Mexico or the under-
performance of previously profitable non-
financialinvestments in Spain. Nevertheless,
in the appraisal of new business plans,
interviewees from all three countries
reckoned that internal politics, perceived
risk profile and expected average synergy
were more important factors than expected
financial returns to determine new
investments. Size was also a factor, since:
. . . the bigger the investment, the harder it
was to place strict success criteria (Senior
Manager, 25 May 1996).
However, financial returns were considered
important when participants assessed the
cost of retreat (divest) from a strategic
failure. Current financial under-performance
according to 46 per cent of responses was the
main stimulus to review business
continuation. Divestiture was only likely
when the business line or business unit had
failed to meet financial performance targets
over a sustained period of time and when
managers’ expectations were that future
financial returns would be inadequate.
In other words, the influence of expected
profitability compared with any formal
diversification and divestiture policy
explained the importance attached to the
overall economic cycle and the growth
potential of individual markets rather than
strategic exploitation of core capabilities in
selecting bank growth opportunities.
When respondents were asked whether
financial considerations dominated strategic
considerations in strategy design in 18 per
cent of cases managers considered strategic
criteria as more important, in 46 per cent
financial performance to be more important
and in 23 per cent considered using both in
combination. The main argument used by
participants in explaining the emphasis on
strategic or financial control involved the
level of tolerance to cross-subsidisation.
Some interviewees justified cross-
subsidisation as inevitable within a ``global
client’’ relationship (Senior Manager, 29 June
1996), with the need for uniform provision at
every point of service enforcing a tolerance of
deteriorating market performance in
particular market segments or regions.
The possibility of cross-subsidisation
suggested that banks set performance targets
through strategic control processes and that
bank managers perceived core capabilities as
a broad platform for growth. Had they
perceived core capabilities as a unique set of
resources they would have been less likely to
engage in activities that effectively inhibit
adjustment such as cross-subsidisation. One
effect of cross-subsidisation was, therefore,
that managers were unable to remove under-
performing activities without disrupting the
client portfolio.
Managers also tolerate cross-subsidies in
the absence of clear economies of scale or
economies of scope. Cross-subsidisation
allows high financial return business to
finance low-return businesses while the
latter achieve strategic goals hopefully
Table IV
Discount rates to evaluate new investments, 1996
Country of origin Sector
Mexico Spain UK Banks Analysts Consult
Average cost of equity funds 37.9 12.6 16.0 18.9 17.5 18.9
Standard deviation 10.19 4.13 3.19 12.35 10.39 10.63
Average discount rate applied to evaluate:
Stand alone business 37.6 12.7 15.2 18.4 15.4 21.1
Standard deviation 11.69 4.46 3.79 12.50 8.90 10.49
Business that is critical
for core capabilities 36.2 12.1 14.2 17.8 14.8 18.3
Standard deviation 9.96 5.41 3.38 11.81 9.08 10.73
Businesses that were strategic
complement to existing businesses 36.2 11.9 15.2 17.4 15.4 19.3
Standard deviation 9.96 5.34 3.00 11.67 8.90 10.34
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through time. Cross-subsidisation may also
lower risk since it provides a net result
which remains relatively constant in face of
short-term environmental change.
Core competencies and diversification in
retail banking services
Widespread use of cross-subsidisationmeans
that few bank activities are closely related to
their cost determinants or served areas
(Gardener and Molyneux, 1990, p. 218;
Channon, 1988, p. 14). The participant sample
confirmed this view with only 30 per cent
being able to provide a distinctive view of
their drivers of profitability.
Following Canals (1994, p. 197), bank
managers were considered able to identify
their core capabilities if they recognised how
a bank’s value added rises or falls when it
provides a changing bundle of services to
their customers. Their understanding of
effectiveness of distribution, client capture
and treasury activities together with drivers
such as experience or scale effects, scope or
service synergy effects, channel synergy, cost
substitution with particular emphasis on IT
and human resource management also
demonstrate awareness of core capabilities
(Canals, 1994, p. 199). Bank managers were
considered unable to identify or control their
banks’ drivers of profitability if they showed
low awareness of these drivers and if their
banks used extensive cross-subsidisationand
pursued portfolio diversification.
Interviewees were further subdivided by
reference to diversification strategies. On
these criteria the participant sample
contained 40 per cent unable to identify core
capabilities while actively diversifying (67
per cent in the case of the Mexico). The next
biggest group at 30 per cent consisted of
managers unable to identify core capabilities
but pursuing specialisation strategies.
Managers able to identify core capabilities
represented in total 30 per cent of the
sample and of these 18 per cent were
pursuing specialisation strategies and 12 per
cent diversification. The details appear in
Table V.
The rationale given most frequently by the
group unable to identify core capabilities but
diversifying was a drive towards potential
cross-selling opportunities based on
enhanced customer relationships. Incursions
into investment banking and bancassurance
(i.e. acting as insurance providers) were
common in these banks. Inadequate
Management Information Systems (MIS)
were cited as the main barrier to fully
exploiting customer loyalty, cross-selling
opportunities or other intangibles and the
development of relational databases to
support marketing strategies at customer
level was the priority. The need for a core
MIS capability to deliver individual
customer profitability analysis and support
predictive models of customers’ purchasing
behaviour is implicit even if unrecognised.
Bank-based participants able to identify
core capabilities and basing specialisation
round them had created indisputable
leadership in a number of businesses such as
credit cards, mortgages or relationships with
small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs).
Despite relatively low margins associated
with many of the two or three ``basic’’ lines of
business, the link to core capabilities clearly
determined resource allocation, employee
training and development of new skills. New
lines of business were considered only if the
synergies were strong enough to justify it as
a stand alone business.
These specialising banks did support other
financial services simultaneously to the
``basic’’ lines of business and these were
called non-differentiating services by some
interviewees to emphasise that they were not
specialist or niche players. Such non-
differentiating services are provided only so
far as they are needed to satisfy customers
recruited for core or basic business lines. The
strategic rationale was to avoid the universal
bank ethos (i.e. providing all services, to all
people and to all geographies). As one
interviewee said:
The loss of money accrued while engaging in
unknown businesses is far greater than its
profitability (even if that return outweighs
the opportunity cost of other investments)
(Senior Manager, 25 June 1996).
This type of incumbent chose building
franchise value through specialisation and,
accordingly, considered core capabilities as a
unique set of resources. Clearly identified
core capabilities created enhanced
competitiveness in respect of selected
markets and customers. Interviewees’
preferred path for growth resulted from
enhanced internal efficiency and greater
penetration within national boundaries.
Diversification and size of commercial
banks
The participant respondents able to identify
core capabilities yet pursuing diversification
strategies considered their biggest
growth opportunities to be in cross-border
growth and non-related diversification.
Non-related diversification included
investments in non-financial activities such
as telecommunications. Generally this
diversifyinggroup was leading banks in their
countries judged by asset size, whereas
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sized.
For these diversifying banks the key skills
to develop were IT related. Competitive
advantage was expected to arise from
developing software to support cross-sell
opportunities, reduce back-office related
costs and manage a plethora of distribution
channels.In their internal organisation these
banks relied in divisionalautonomy as much
as co-ordination. They also claimed to be in
the process of changing orientation from
Strategic Business Units to management by
objectives and segmented customer focus.
In summary, more banks anticipate
developing competitive advantage through
greater diversification than through
concentrating on the development of core
capabilities. This reflects bank managers’
desire to create growth through new business
lines instead of favouring slimmer business
portfolios or improved use of capital. Natural
synergies between disparate businesses are
low other than through a unifying database
available to staff at any point of customer
contact and capable of monitoring
profitability in ``real-time’’. Successful IT
developments will then enable the banks to
tap into previously unexplored customer
groups. However, historically technological
innovations have tended to move rapidly
from a source of competitive advantage to a
generic competitive requirement. The logic
of widespread focus on an IT-based strategy
is consolidation since the scale and
experience effects ensure that only a few
banks can be winners.
Discussion
The research results suggest generic
strategies such as unbridled diversification
are perceived to have achieved partial
success. As expressed by one interviewee:
So our diversification, in terms of its
contribution to the bottom line, is not perhaps
fully understood just yet. Once it is, then we
could have a lot of questions being asked as to
why are we in this particular market (Senior
Manager, 20 October 1996).
Different levels of urgency to assess core
capabilities suggested that regulation policy
had direct but not immediate effects on the
development of strategic planning activities
at commercial banks. At present only some
banks seemed willing to address tough
decisions associated with strict budget
priorities that logically follow such planning.
Hence, an unsuspected effect of regulation
policy might have been to favour universal
banking as a competitive paradigm because
interview results suggest that most banks
place greater importance in developing entry
deterrence strategies than in mechanisms to
identify the most attractive growth
opportunities. Bank management seems
likely to pursue a mix of financial and
strategic goals but striking a balance seems
difficult because shared inputs could be
equally suited to a number of the strategic
opportunities in over-diversified firms.
Interview results also suggested that an
overwhelming number of banks realise
competitive advantage by tactical and even
random strategies rather than making long-
term budgetary commitments to develop core
capabilities. This finding reinforces a view
that deregulation and technological change
have increased threats of entry from non-
bank and non-finance intermediaries who
have the relevant capabilities. The response
of bank managers has been primarily to deter
the entry of these challengers rather than
implementing long-term strategies. For the
immediate future most banks will continue
to cover potential gaps in their market
coverage and deny entry by increasing the
number of services provided to their
customers and developing IT-based
applications for ever finer market
segmentation in their home markets. Only a
selected number of banks will pursue
Table V
Relationship of core capabilities and business scope, 1996
Strategy
Specialisation Diversification
Able to identify 0.0 of Mexican 0.0 of Mexican
18.2 of Spanish 18.2 of Spanish
31.3 of British 12.5 of British
18.0 of sample 12.0 of sample
Unable to identify 33.3 of Mexican 66.7 of Mexican
31.8 of Spanish 31.8 of Spanish
25.0 of British 31.3 of British
30.0 of sample 40.0 of sample
Note: As a percentage of total interviewees and participants by country
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reinforce core capabilities through
amalgamations and pursue strategic targets
that promise economies of scope.
Succinctly, interview results suggested
that bank managers are more likely to
pursue strategies on the basis of ``traditional
ways of doing things’’ or taken-for-granted
assumptions rooted in experience rather
than in the basis of resources, processes and
skills that are key to provide customer value
and sustain competitive advantage.
Finally, the current research offered a
review of changes common to retail markets
for banking services in three distinct
competitive environments (Mexico, Spain
and the UK). Future research could then
probe deeper to identify key elements in
consumer decisions to purchase specific
financial services in retail markets
characterised by different competitive
intensities. One possibility would measure
changes in consumer perceptions due to the
introduction of the Euro in member and non-
member States or deposit insurance schemes
in Mexico, the USA and Canada.
Alternatively, research in the strategy to
supply retail bank services could focus on
how managers in different countries have
dealt with environmental forces and fitted
their banks’ business portfolio and re-
engineered business processes to served
markets, customer groups and geographic
areas.
Notes
1 The definition given was: core capabilities are
those dimensions that determine a bank’s
competitive position. They are core because
without them it would be impossible for the
bank to survive.
2 Results from two-way ANOVA (with and
without replication) together with linear
correlation analysis failed to achieve
statistical significance. These estimates are
available from the authors.
References
Baltensperger, E. (1980), ``Alternative approaches
to the theory of the banking firm’’, Journal of
Monetary Economics, Vol. 6, pp. 1-37.
Bank of England (1991), ``The performance of
British banks’’, Bank of England Quarterly
Bulletin, Vol. 31, pp. 508-15.
Baumol, W. et al. (1982), Contestable Markets and
the Theory of Industry Structure, Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, New York, NY.
Belson, W. and Duncan, J.A. (1978), ``A
comparison of the check-list and the open
response questioning systems’’, in Bynner, J.
and Stribley, K.M. (Eds), Social Research:
Principles and Procedures, The Open
University, Milton Keynes.
Benston, G.J. and Smith, C.W. Jr (1976), ``A
transactions cost approach to the theory of
financial intermediation’’, Journal of
Finance, Vol. 31, pp. 215-31.
Bowman, C. and Ambrosini, V. (1997), ``Using
single respondents in strategy research’’,
British Journal of Management, Vol. 8,
pp. 119-31.
Canals, J. (1994), Competitive Strategies in
European Banking, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Channon, D.F. (1988), Global Banking Strategy,
John Wiley & Sons, New York, NY.
Collis, D. (1994), ``Research note: how valuable are
your organizational capabilities?’’, Strategic
Management Journal, Vol. 15, pp. 143-52.
Conner, K. (1991), ``A historical comparison of
resource-based theory and five schools of
thought within industrial organization
economics: do we have a new theory of the
firm?’’, Journal of Management, Vol. 17 No. 1,
pp. 121-54.
Dickens, R.A. and Phillippatos, G.C. (1994), ``The
impact of market contestability on the
systematic risk of US bank stocks’’, Applied
Financial Economics, Vol. 4, pp. 315-22.
Eisenhardt, K.M. (1989), ``Building theories from
case study research’’, Academy of
Management Review, Vol. 14 No. 4, pp. 532-50.
Foddy, W. (1993), Constructing Questions for
Interviews and Questionnaires, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Fraser, D.R., Gup, B.E. and Kolari, J.W. (1995),
Commercial Banking: The Management of
Risk, West Publishing Co., St Paul, MN.
Gardener, E.P.M. and Molyneux, P. (1990),
Changes in Western European Banking,
Unwin Hyman, London.
Gavito, J. et al. (1992), ``Los Servicios Financieros
y el Acuerdo de Libre Comercio: bancos y
casas de bolsa’’, in Andere, E. and Kessel, G.
(Eds), Me Âxico y el Tratado Trilateral de Libre
Comercio, McGraw-Hill±ITAM, Me Âxico D.F.,
pp. 213-46.
Gilbert, A. (1984), ``Bank market structure and
competition: a survey’’, Journal of Money
Credit and Banking, Vol. 16 No. 4, pp. 617-45.
Gordem, R.L. (1975), ``Styles and objectives in
interviewing’’ in Interviewing: Strategy,
Techniques and Tactics, Dorsey Press,
Homewood, IL.
Grant, R.M. (1991), ``The resource-based theory of
competitive advantage: implications for
strategy formulation’’, California
Management Review, Spring, pp. 114-35.
Hamel, G. and Prahalad, C.K. (1994), Competing
for the Future, Harvard University Press,
Boston, MA.
Heffernan, S. (1996), Modern Banking in Theory
and Practice, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester.
Humphrey, D. and Pulley, L. (1997), ``Banks’
responses to deregulation: profits,
technology, and efficiency’’, Journal of Money
Credit and Banking, Vol. 29 No. 1, pp. 73-93.
[99]
Bernardo Ba Âtiz-Lazo and
Douglas Wood
Management of core
capabilities in Mexican and
European banks
International Journal of Bank
Marketing
19/2 [2001] 89±100Klein, M.A.(1971), ``A theory of the banking firm’’,
Journal of Money Credit and Banking, Vol. 3
No. 2, pp. 205-18.
Lewis, B.R. (1994), ``Customer service and
quality’’, in McGoldrick, P.J. and Greenland,
S.J. (Eds), Retailing of Financial Services,
McGraw-Hill, London, pp. 266-88.
Lloyd-Williams, D.M., Molyneux, P., and Thorton,
J. (1994), ``Market structure and performance
in Spanish banking’’, Journal of Banking and
Finance, Vol. 18, pp. 433-43.
McKechnie, S. (1997), ``Consumer buying
behaviour in financial services: an
overview’’, in Meidan, A., Lewis, B.R. and
Moutinho, L. (Eds), Financial Services
Marketing, The Dryden Press, London,
pp. 64-77.
Moser, C.A. and Kalton, G. (1978), ``Question
wording’’, in Bynner, J. and Stribley, K.M.
(Eds), Social Research: Principles and
Procedures, The Open University, Milton
Keynes.
Muda, M. (1993), ``Environment, organization and
bank performance’’, PhD thesis, Faculty of
Business Administration, University of
Manchester, mimeo.
Neven, D. (1990), ``Structural adjustment in
European retail banking’’, in Dermine, J.
(Ed.), European Banking in the 1990s,
Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 163-88.
Oppenheim, A.N. (1992), Questionnaire Design,
Interviewing and Attitude Measurement,
Pinter Publishers, London.
Penrose, E. (1959), The Theory of the Growth of the
Firm, 2nd ed., 1980, Blackwell, Oxford.
Porter, M.E. (1985), Competitive Advantage,
Free Press, New York, NY.
Ramanujan, V. and Varadarajan, R. (1989),
``Research on corporate diversification: a
synthesis’’, Strategic Management Journal,
Vol. 10 No. 6, pp. 531-51.
Robson, C. (1993), Real World Research: A
Resource for Social Scientist and Practitioner-
Researchers, Blackwell, Oxford.
Rumelt, R.P. (1974), Strategy, Structure and
Economic Performance, Harvard Business
School Press, Boston, MA.
Schulze, W.S. (1994), ``The two schools of
thought in resource-based theory: definitions
and implications for research’’, Advances
in Strategic Management, Vol. 10A,
pp. 127-51.
Shepherd, A. (1998), ``Understanding and using
value chain analysis’’, in Ambrosini, V. et al.
(Eds), Exploring Techniques of Analysis and
Evaluation in Strategic Management,
Prentice-Hall, London.
Swank, J. (1996), ``Theories of the banking firm: a
review of the literature’’, Bulletin of Economic
Research, Vol. 48 No. 3, pp. 173-207.
Walter, I. (1997), ``Universal banking: a
shareholder value perspective’’, European
Management Journal, Vol. 15 No. 4, pp. 344-60.
Yin, R.K. (1984), Case Study Research: Design and
Methods, Sage Publications, London.
Yip, G. (1982), ``Diversification entry: internal
development versus acquisition’’, Strategic
Management Journal, Vol. 3, pp. 331-45.
[100]
Bernardo Ba Âtiz-Lazo and
Douglas Wood
Management of core
capabilities in Mexican and
European banks
International Journal of Bank
Marketing
19/2 [2001] 89±100